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REVIEWS� 
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of 
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned 
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani­
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments 
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the 
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama­
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The 
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited. 
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed' 
list should contact the Editor. 
Tom Regan, All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights 
and Environmental Ethics 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 1982 
pp. 249, $18.95 
This collection of essays is an 
important sequel to the work of 
another philosopher, Peter Singer, 
whose Animal Liberation - A New Eth­
ics for Our Treatment of Animals, 
(Avon Books, 1975) has been widely 
quoted by those who would emancipate 
animals. In Animal Liberation the 
central thesis is that animals have 
moral standing, deriving from undeni­
able, empirical evidence that they are 
sentient individuals, sharing with man 
the capacity to experience pain and 
pleasure, and whose interests in terms 
of needs, desires, purposes, goals, 
and so on, ought therefore to be 
given equal consideration with the Ii ke 
interests of humans. By arguing for 
equal consideration of interests as 
between humans and other animal 
species, Singer unwittingly set the 
stage for what has since become a 
widely based campaign to secu re for 
animals a benefit that has hitherto 
been considered the exclusive pre­
serve of humans: recognition of the 
right to be treated in accordance with 
universally accepted principles of 
morality and justice, a right that 
would be legally enforceable in the 
cou rts. There can be no question 
that if this campaign succeeds, it 
could usher in fundamental changes in 
human customs and attitudes toward 
various classes of animals: those used 
for food, in experimentation, in the 
manufacture of clothing and cosmetics, 
for sport, and in many other ways. 
In All That Dwell Therein, Regan 
goes further than Singer. Firstly, he 
invokes the idea that all or some ani­
mals may indeed qualify as rights 
holders, something which Singer ref­
uses to do, since "that wou Id be mak­
ing a concession to popular moral 
rhetoric" . Secondly, he proposes a 
generalized theory of rights which is 
based not on Singer's equal consider­
ation of interests principle, nor on 
sentience, which other philosophers 
have cited in arguing the case for 
rights, but rather on the view that 
the most reasonable criterion of rights 
possession is what he calls the cri­
terion of inherent value. By this is 
meant that the individual in question, 
whether human or non-human, is not 
only a living being but is also the 
subject of a life that is better or 
worse for him (her), independently of 
whether anyone else finds his (her) 
life useful, or to put it in the lan­
guage of the philosopher, "of a life 
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which is logically independent of any 
other being's taking an interest in 
it. " 
Uncompelling as this may seem at 
the outset, it proves to be a recu r­
ring theme in more than half of the 
essays, which, as we are told in the 
Preface, consist of "papers and lec­
tu res written and delivered over the 
past six yea rs or so on the general 
topic of human obligations to non-hu­
mans. The non-humans at issue 
include not only non-human animals, 
though our obligations to animals, and 
their rights against us, are major 
themes in most of the essays; also at 
issue is the question of the founda­
tions of ou r moral relations to natu re 
generally . This latter question 
comes into full flower in the last three 
essays, but it is a question that is 
growing just beneath the surface 
th roughout" . 
To those readers who have thought 
at length about the rights issue, it 
will come as no surprise to learn that 
if rights are to be ascribed to ani­
mals, that is, to some or all living 
animals ranging in size from the great 
whales to amoebas, irrespective of the 
inter- and intra-species differences in 
intelligence, physiology, behavior and 
communication capacities that they may 
or may not exhibit, the definitive 
solution to the question may ultimately 
be grounded in the wider context of 
envi ronmental ethics. The very title 
of this book indicates that it is not 
only animals, collectively and individ­
ually (including Homo ~apiens) on 
which attention is being focused, but 
also the rights of present and future 
generations to the enjoyment of satis­
factory places of habitation. Thus, it 
is mankind's moral obligation to pro­
tect, or at the very least, not to 
harm, the biocoenosis or biosphere as 
a whole: the land, the water and the 
air and all who live there and depend 
on it for their continued sustenance 
and existence, that is the underlying 
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issue of this book. 
Given the theory that the criterion 
of inherent worth is the most reason­
able criterion of rights possession, it 
is logical to ask "Can the concept of 
inherent value be applied to inanimate 
natu re?", more particularly in light of 
the explanatory passages contained in 
essays 3, 4, and 6, where "inherent 
value" is used specifically in reference 
to animate individuals. In essays 8 
and 9, however,- which are titled 
respectively "What Sorts of Bei ngs 
Can Have Rights?" and "The Nature 
and Possibility of an Environmental 
Ethic", the author makes some initial, 
halting, steps toward establishing that 
"a genuine ethic of the environment, 
distinct from a 'management ethic', 
which views the natural order as a 
system of 'resources' calling for 'wise 
management', and from a 'kinship eth­
ic', which widens the scope of those 
meriting direct moral concern to 
include sentient non-humans" could be 
rooted in such a value. Here he 
examines and finds wanting, argu­
ments advanced by those who chal­
lenge the view that "non-conscious 
non-sentient objects (such as trees, 
flowers and even rivers) have a good 
or value of their own", and sketches 
in outline the essentials of an ethic 
that would recognize the independent 
value of both the fauna and the flora 
of the natural order. In so doing, he 
draws attention to the manifest inade­
quacy of the traditional notions of 
cruelty and kindness, previously dis­
cussed in essays 3 ("Animal Experi­
mentation: First Thoughts"), 4 
("Animal Rights, Human Wrongs") and 
5 ("Why Whaling is Wrong") as means 
of preventing or alleviating suffering 
inflicted by humans, and helps pre­
pa re the way for the development of a 
"deep ecology" rather than a "shallow 
envi ronmentalism" view of ou r obliga­
tions to the natu ral world. These 
ideas are more fully developed in the 
final essay, which examines the ear'ly 
history and possible motivations of the 
all rationally entitled to demand that Peter J. Hyde 
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North American Indian peoples' 
involvement in the fur trade, when 
fur-bearing animals as well as buffalo 
were systematically overkilled, even to 
the point of rendering local popula­-
tions of the animals extinct. 
No review of these essays would be 
complete if it failed to draw attention 
to the emphasis which is placed by 
Regan on our moral obligation to be 
vegetarians. In the first essay ("The 
Moral Basis. of Vegetarianism") he 
argues that the right to life and the 
moral right not to be caused gratui­-
tous suffering "are possessed by the 
animals we eat if they are possessed 
by the humans we do not". After 
examining the manner in which animals 
are raised and killed under modern 
factory farming conditions, he points 
out that almost everyone who buys 
meat at a typical supermarket or res­-
taurant is causally implicated in a 
practice which causes pain that is 
both "non-trivial and undeserved" for 
the animals in question. But as he 
shows later in the essay, it is the 
killing of animals, and not just their 
pain, that matters morally. 
Regan argues that just as we are 
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those who are implicated In a practice 
that causes non-trivial, undeserved 
pain to human beings must show how 
it is that the practice, and their role 
in it, is not immoral, so also is the 
vegetarian in a position where he can 
rationally demand that those who lead 
a life contrary to his show how it is 
that their way of life can be morally 
justified. Nevertheless, he does not 
claim that all practices that involve 
the killing of animals for food cannot 
possibly be justified. The situation of 
the Eskimo (Inuit) is cited as one 
instance in which this could be so. 
In bringing before the public a 
collection of writings by one of the 
foremost thinkers in this domain, All 
That Dwell Therein has much to offer 
all those readers whose interests, 
concerns, occupations, and academic 
or professional affiliations cause them 
to ponder the true natu re of man's 
ethical obligations to non-human life 
and the environment. More particu­-
larly, it should be of interest to leg­-
islators, educators and others who 
may be in a position to influence the 
course of our moral and cultural evo­-
lution. 
